The objective of this study is to estimate the degree of oligopsony power in the U.S. cattle industry with the use of the recently developed stochastic frontier estimator of market power. Unlike the seminal paper where estimation of the mark-up in an output market at firm level was the main objective, this work proposes a stochastic production frontier estimator in order to estimate the mark-down in an input market at aggregate level. 
Introduction
The U.S. agricultural sector has been revolutionized by a process called agricultural industrialization. This process refers to the production, coordination, and distribution of food products using modern methods typically associated with industrial manufacturing. In the beef sector, the benefits of industrialization include higher productivity and the availability of leaner and higher quality beef products.
Despite these benefits, some aspects of industrialization raise questions about the performance of the beef marketing system. One particular aspect is rising concentration in the beef-packing industry and its effect on live cattle prices. Since the 1980s, the U.S. fed-cattle industry has experienced shifts of production to larger farms. At the same time, the beef-packing industry has become much more concentrated than cattle feeding (?). Data from the ? show that both the number and the size distribution of beef-packing plants has changed dramatically in the recent years. Between 1980 and 2012 the number of plants decreased from 704 to 168 and the share of the top four firm in steer and heifer slaughter increased from 35.7% to 85%. During the years, the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) reached the level of 85 percent in 2010, dropped to 84 percent in 2011, and raised again to 85 percent in 2012. According to the same report, the four-firm concentration ratio has remained around 80% in the last ten years. In theory, the higher the CR4, meaning the closer it approaches 100%, the greater the likelihood the four largest firms are exercising market power.
Whether such high levels of concentration are detrimental to competition in live cattle markets has been the subject of many studies using different economic models, time spans, and statistical techniques. More importantly, as more slaughter cattle is now procured through contracts, otherwise know as captive supplies, there is also concern that packers may also "manipulate" cash prices to influence the base price used to negotiate contracts.
Higher levels of concentration generally lead to lower prices paid for fed cattle indicating that the beef-packing industry exerts some degree of market power when procuring live cattle (????). That degree of oligopsonistic power, according to some studies, is not large enough to warrant concern (??). In most of these studies, the magnitude of market power is relatively small and seemingly within an "acceptable" public policy level (?). On the other hand, since beefpacking is a high-volume/low-margin business (?), some researchers argue that given the large volume of cattle slaughtered every year, even a small degree of market power can translate into large transfers from the cattle producers to beefpackers. Hence, a seemingly small impact in dollars per hundredweight ($/cwt) can make a substantial difference (losses) to livestock producers (?). Yet some authors report that losses to cattle producers are more than offset by the cost savings generated by increased concentration in the beef-packing industry, suggesting this way that structural changes are beneficial from an efficiency viewpoint (??). Lastly, some studies find no evidence of market power exercised by the beef packers during the time period considered in their study (??).
Granted that there is merit to each of the preceding arguments, all of them hang to a large degree on the academic research that guides them. The most influential research in the past few years has been what is commonly known as the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO). In a nutshell, NEIO is an econometric approach that treats market power as a parameter to be inferred from single industries data (?).
Against this background, the objective of the present work is to revisit the econometric problem of estimating the degree of oligopsony power in the U.S.
cattle industry with the use of the recently developed stochastic frontier (SFA) estimation technique by Khumbhakar, Baardsen and Lien (2012) . In their article, ? propose a new method of estimating market power in an output market at firm level. They draw on the stochastic frontier methodology from the efficiency lit-erature in order to estimate markups in the Norwegian sawmilling industry. The authors use both primal and dual specifications to represent the technology and consequently estimate the degree of oligopoly power. Both approaches reveal statistically significant evidence of market power. The primal and dual specifications of the technology is a big advantage of the stochastic frontier approach of market power estimation: in an output market, based on duality theory of cost and input distance functions, either input price data or quantity price data can be used. On the other hand, duality of revenue functions and output distance functions can be utilized for the case of the input market. Furthermore, the stochastic frontier estimation technique allows us to estimate market power under constant or variable returns to scale, which is not always the case in the NEIO approach, providing us with more flexibility in the measurement of mark-ups/downs of an industry.
In the most recent paper, ? used the stochastic frontier estimator in order to This study proposes a stochastic production frontier estimator in order to estimate the mark-down in an input market at industry level. The input market under investigation is the U.S. cattle industry. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no published work which has used the stochastic frontier approach in order to estimate the degree of oligopsony power exercised by the U.S. beefpacking industry when procuring live cattle.
The present work is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the theoretical framework. Section 3 presents the empirical model to be estimated at aggregate level and Section 4 the data and estimation results. Section 5 provides a summary and conclusion.
Theoretical framework

Beef packing firm
The starting point of this work is the profit maximizing beef packing firm. The profits for a beef processor (i) are given by:
where x i is the cattle input and z i the rest of the inputs employed by firm i in order to produce beef (q i ). Beef is a homogeneous good sold at price P. In this study, we assume that the packer has no degree of market power when selling the beef output. On the other hand, the packer has some degree of oligopsonistic power when purchasing live cattle. The price of cattle is W x , where W x = W x (X).
The rest of the inputs employed by the processor in the production of beef are competitively priced (W z ).
Profit maximization with respect to the livestock input means that:
Using equation 1 we get:
The expression
captures the increase in total cattle supply induced by an increase in processor i's demand for cattle. After rearrangement of equation 3 we get:
where is the elasticity of cattle supply and is positive, and
X is the conjectural variation elasticity parameter. The values of the parameter φ i range from zero to one. This means that from equation 4 we get the following inequality:
If we multiply both sides of the above equation by (
We can transform the inequality in equation 6 to an equality by adding a nonnegative, one-sided term u i :
Translog representation of a stochastic frontier production function for the beef packing firm
? used a translog production function in order to estimate the indices of market power in the U.S. red meat industry. As the authors point out, a translog production function does not impose severe a priori constraints on the production characteristics in the industry. By employing a translog production function the authors dispense with the necessity of assuming fixed proportions for the input of interest. There is well documented research that food processing industries are characterized by input substitutability. ? found evidence of substantial substitution possibilities between farm inputs and marketings inputs for beef and veal.
In addition, ? concluded that technological changes in the food industries have allowed for greater input substitutability. In the light of the preceding we employ a variable proportions technology in order to represent the production process in the beef packing sector. More specifically, for a beef processor i, the production process is captured by the following translog production function:
where x i =cattle input, L i =labor, K i =capital, and E i =energy are employed by processor i in order to produce q i =beef output. The time index t is included to account for technological progress. The above function is assumed to satisfy the following restrictions:
and β KE = β EK .
From equation 8, the expression for
Substituting equation 9 into equation 7 we get the stochastic version of the profit maximizing relationship for the beef packing firm:
The composed error term (−u i + e i ) in equation 10 is no different than the one from a stochastic production frontier model. 1 Hence, equation 10 can be estimated using the maximum likelihood method which is commonly used to estimate a stochastic production frontier. The maximum likelihood method is based on the distributional assumption of the errors. Following the literature, the distributional assumptions are that u i is a normal variable truncated at zero from
, and e i is the usual two-sided normal noise term, i.e. e i
). In this work, unlike the stochastic frontier analysis approach, the onesided term u i in equation 10 does not account for the inefficiency in production, but for the mark-down in the cattle market for a beef packing firm.
A stochastic production frontier estimator of oligopsony power for the beef packing firm
In this work we define the degree of market power exerted by the i th beef packing firm as:
Re-arranging equation 11 we get:
Hence, the relationship between the degree of market power θ i and the mark down term u i is given by the equation below:
After estimating u i from equation 10 and with the help of the expression in equation 9, we can proceed with the estimation of θ i as:
The mark-down parameter θ i of equation 11 can be expanded as:
Solving the above equation we get:
Equation 14 will be used in order to derive the relationship between the Lerner index of market power and the degree of market power θ i for the case of a single beef processor i:
Hence, after estimating θ i with the help of equation 13, the Lerner index of oligopsony power for the beef packer i can be estimated as:
Aggregation and empirical model
The absence of panel data on firm-level suggests that we can neither estimate the mark down term u i nor the degree of market power θ i . As a consequence, we cannot proceed with the estimation of the Lerner index of oligopsony power exercised by the U.S. beef packing firms when purchasing live cattle. This limitation leads us to consider the problem at aggregate level. In order to achieve this we make the assumption that in equilibrium the conjectural variation elasticities do not vary across firms (?). This means that φ i =Φ for every beef-packer in the industry. As ? point out, maintaining the invariance of the conjectural variation across firms enables us to drop the subscript i on the marginal products and consider the result as a weighted industry marginal product, where the weights are each firm's share in the cattle market.
More specifically, multiplying through equation 3 by
X and summing across the N firms of the industry we obtain the aggregate supply relation:
move the constant terms out of the summations:
and since ∑ N i=1 x i X = 1, we get:
where
X MP x i is the weighted industry marginal product (?). Hence, the industry analogue of equation 4 is:
where Φ represents the industry-wide index of market power in the livestock market. Since and Φ are positive, the equality of equation 19 can be written in the form of an inequality as:
The inequality in equation 20 has the same direction as the inequality in equation 5. Multiplying through by ( 1 P X Q ), adding a positive term u in order to transform the above inequality to an equality and following the same procedure described in section 2, but at market level, we arrive at the following relationship:
The main difference between equation 10 and equation 21 is that the former is at firm level while the latter is at industry level. Estimation of equation 21 will provide us with estimates of the term u at market level. After estimating u, we can estimate the degree of market power θ for the industry as:
It is clear from equation 22 that the estimate of the parameter θ depends on the estimated values of u as well as on the relevant parameters of the translog production function.
Finally, the Lerner index of market power exercised by the U.S. beef-packing industry when procuring live cattle will be estimated as:
Data and estimation results
The the production of beef, we multiply the aggregate levels of the above mentioned factors of production with the percentage of the beef product in relationship with the rest of the meat products.
Capital is taken into account as a quasi-fixed input. The annual user cost of capital was calculated as the sum of the real interest rate and the depreciation rate. 3 Energy was deflated in order to obtain an approximation to the physical quantity used in this study. The estimates of the parameters of the translog production function employed in estimating equation 21 are presented in Table 2 . 4 All estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level of significance or less with the exception of the time parameter. Table 3 In the aforementioned studies, distortions in cattle prices due to oligopsonistic power exercised in the cattle market were as low as 1% (Schroeter1988). On the other hand, Azzam and Schroeter (1990) estimate that 55% of the farm-to-retail price spread in the beef market can be attributed to market power with oligopsonistic and oligopolistic power having almost an equal contribution.
The empirical results of this work suggest that fed cattle were priced 18.62%
lower than their net marginal value product, indicating evidence of non-competitive behavior in the U.S. cattle industry. Spatial characteristics of the cattle market can be employed to provide a possible explanation for the findings of this article. Live cattle can be transported only a limited distance to slaughter. Shipping live animals long distances is quite costly and can cause high levels of mortality. Hence, cattle producers to a particular location may face few buyers who might exert market power when purchasing cattle for slaughter. The statistical significant findings of this study support the above statement. Furthermore, the value of the mark-down parameter u is positive for each observation in the sample, strengthening this way our argument for the potential presence of non-competitive behavior in the U.S. cattle industry over the period examined in this work.
Summary and conclusion
The objective of this paper was to measure the degree of oligopsony power in the U.S. cattle industry with the use of the recently developed stochastic frontier estimator of market power. In this work, unlike the seminal paper that measures the mark-up in an output market at firm level, we develop a stochastic production frontier estimator in order to estimate the mark-down in an input (cattle) market at industry level.
The starting point of this work is the profit maximizing beef-packing firm.
Optimizing and using elements from the SFA literature we derive a stochastic production frontier estimator of market power for the individual beef packer.
Unfortunately, firm specific data are rarely available. We resolve this difficulty by providing a method in order to produce market power estimates at aggregate level.
Our empirical results indicate that the U.S. beef-packing industry exercises market power when procuring live cattle. The value of the mark-down term u is positive and statistically significant. The estimated value of the Lerner index of oligopsonistic power is 0.2289 and is statistically different than zero. The specific finding suggests that, on average, the net value of the marginal product of cattle is 22.9% higher than the price of cattle. Hence, based on the empirical outcome of this study, one can conclude that there is significant evidence that cattle feeders receive lower prices due to the fact that the U.S. market for live cattle might be imperfectly competitive.
The outcome of this study should be interpreted in light of data limitations and model construction. A more appropriate data set would contain information on the exact number of inputs employed only for beef production. Unfortunately, annual data from the Census are available only for aggregate red meat output. Furthermore, the choice of the form of the production function can affect the empirical results of the model. 
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